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The world economy recently witnessed a surge in trade 
remedies and non-tariff measures (NTMs) as new trade-restrictive 
measures. This study attempts to provide empirical evidence 
on the effects of new trade-restrictive measures, such as anti-
dumping, countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures on trade. By using the 
Korean product-level export data and the new NTM data, we find 
that new trade-restrictive measures in trade can depend on the 
affected sectors and imposing countries. Exports can be adversely 
affected by new trade-restrictive measures in their concentrated 
sectors taken by importing developed countries. We also find 
the threatening effects of trade remedy before this investigation. 
However, new trade-restrictive measures imposed by importing 
developing countries can have positive impact on trade, particularly 
an increase in consumers’ trust in product quality and decrease 
in asymmetric information. Results imply that the government of 
an exporting party should enhance trade policies by considering 
the heterogeneous effects of new trade-restrictive measures across 
industries and trading partners.
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Trade Remedy, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
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I. Introduction
The average world tariff rate has steadily declined (Figure 1) since 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. This 
decline is due to multilateral negotiations and rapid increase in free 
trade agreements (FTAs) among WTO member countries. However, each 
country was induced to protect domestic import competing sectors 
during the recession in the late 2000s. For FTA member countries, tariff 
may not be an effective trade policy because trading parties need to 
renege on or renegotiate FTAs to raise tariff again. This renegotiation 
is relatively complex and costly. Thus, member countries began to 
increase tariffs using the system of trade remedy (TR) to circumvent 
this process and to raise protectionist measure after the global 
economic downturn in 2008. Moreover, member countries adopted 
non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as technical barriers to trade (TBT) 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS). WTO (2012a) and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2012) 
called these measures “new trade-restrictive measures,” which affected 
0.9% of global imports (Chung et al. 2012). Pascal Lamy, former director 
general of WTO, explained that new trade-restrictive measures are 
considered a long-term strategy to protect infant industries and not a 
short-term remedy for the global financial crisis (WTO 2012b). Exports, 
particularly from developing countries to developed countries, suffered 
during the crisis (Lee 2009).
Figure 2 shows the world trends of trade remedies and technical 
measures, such as TBT and SPS. Both measures have increased since 
the 2008 global financial crisis. UNCTAD (2012) classified protective 
measures into three types, namely, tariff measures, trade remedies, 
and NTMs, in its Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). 
Trade remedies simply consist of three measures: anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties, and safeguard (GATT Articles 6 and 19). 
However, the classification of NTMs can be complicated, depending 
on various research objectives. UNCTAD (2012) established the 
international classification of NTMs into technical, non-technical, and 
export-related measures. Governments mandatorily impose technical 
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures on 
certain products to enhance human security, improve health, provide 
product information, and protect the environment in TBT and SPS. 
Moreover, TBT and SPS can be taken in international trade because 
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each trading party has its own established legitimacy for adopting 
technical measures. These measures have different norms, depending 
on the social, cultural, and geographical backgrounds. TBT mainly 
deals with the external elements of products, such as label, registration, 
and production process. By contrast, SPS deals with internal elements, 
such as additives, pesticide residue, and toxins. Recently, more than 
half of NTMs are technical measures, thereby implying the increasing 
Note:  The value represents the simple average of the MFN applied tariff rate for 
manufacturing.
Source: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution
Figure 1
AnnuAl AverAge TAriff rATe in The World (%)
Note:  The value represents the number of WTO notifications.
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importance of TBT and SPS in international trade (Gourdon and Nicita 
2013).
Trade remedies and technical measures burden exporters with costs 
for defense, certification, and technological development despite their 
legitimacy. An increasing number of studies have been conducted on 
the impact of these new trade-restrictive measures (Arita et al. 2015; 
Choi et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Jang et al. 2011; Bao and Qiu 2012). 
Arita et al. (2015) investigate the effects of selected SPS and TBT on 
agricultural trade between the US and the European Union (EU) and 
find that the estimated ad valorem tariff equivalents of NTMs are 
considerably higher than existing tariffs. Bao and Qiu (2012) use the 
TBT notifications in 1995-2008 and find a decrease and increase in 
the extensive and intensive margins of exports. However, these studies 
have individually dealt with each measure and did not analyze these 
measures simultaneously. The majority of the previous studies also 
used the data from the WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal 
(I-TIP) to determine the number of notifications for trade remedies and 
technical measures. However, only 43% of the entire notifications are 
recorded as a harmonized system (HS) code in the WTO I-TIP data 
set (Ghodsi et al. 2017). Thus, a sectoral investigation with the WTO 
I-TIP data set can generate sample selection bias owing to missing 
information. 
The current study attempts to consider trade remedy and technical 
measures in one model and empirically examine how new trade-
restrictive measures affect Korean exports between 1996 and 2015 by 
using a new data set. We use the recently constructed wiiw (Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies) NTM Database for trade 
remedies and the technical measures recorded at HS 6-digit level unlike 
previous literature. The wiiw NTM Database1 substantially reduces 
the percentage of missing HS code from 57% to 25%. This study is the 
first to use the wiiw NTM Database to resolve bias from the missing 
information in the WTO I-TIP data set.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
investigates the trends of trade remedies and technical measures for 
1 The wiiw NTM data set provides the missing values by taking the HS 
code matching procedure through various sources, such as the International 
Classification Standards, product description, and Temporary Trade Barriers 
Database.
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Korean exports by year, country, sector, and type. Section III provides 
the theoretical background and econometric specifications on the basis 
of the literature review. Section IV shows the empirical results. Section 
V draws the conclusions and presents the policy implications.
II.  Trends of New Trade-Restrictive Measures for Korean 
Exports2
A. Trade Remedies
A total of 5,589 cases of trade remedies were initiated between 1995 
and 2017 from the reports of WTO I-TIP. A total of 362 cases among 
these cases were levied on Korean exports: 342 cases of anti-dumping, 
20 cases of countervailing duties, and no case of safeguard. Moreover, 
68.8% (= (249/362)×100) of initiations of trade remedies were continued. 
Thus, the majority of trade remedies imposed on Korean exports are 
anti-dumping measures with high feasibility. Figure 3 shows the 
number of initiating trade remedies on Korean exports between 1995 
and 2017. This number increased after 1998, decreased in the early 
and mid-2000s, and increased again in 2008. A total of 33 cases are 
recorded in 2016, which was the highest level in the entire sample 
period. New trade-restrictive measures have been recently converted 
(beyond their original legitimacy) as a long-term strategy to protect 
domestic industries, particularly during an economic downturn. 
Figure 3 shows that trade remedies levied on Korean exports were no 
exception.
A total of 24 countries initiated trade remedies on Korean exports in 
the sample period, including India (59 cases, most number of cases), the 
US (56), China (36), Australia (27), Brazil (21), and EU (18). The Korean 
exports has 28 sectors: steel products (122, highest value), organic 
chemical products (52), and plastic products (41). 
Appendix Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the annual number of 
initiating countries and initiated sectors of trade remedies on Korean 
exports. Both numbers substantially increased in the late 1990s, early 
2000s and 2010s. These numbers show similar trends with those in 
2 In this section, we used the WTO I-TIP data set for the majority of the 
analyses. However, the wiiw NTM data set for the sectrol analyses was avoided 
for sample selection bias.
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Figure 3. This increase in trade remedies on Korean exports resulted 
from new initiators and frequent imposition of importers, such as India 
and the US. The initiation of trade remedies on plastic, rubber, steel, 
and chemicals also contributed to increase in the number of cases. 
We find volume and variety matter to consequently increase in trade 
remedies on Korean exports. 
B. Technical Measures
According to the principle of National Treatment (GATT Article 3 
and WTO TBT Agreement Article 2.1), TBT imposed by WTO members 
should not target other member countries. Accordingly, TBT should be 
equally applied across countries, which is different from trade remedies 
and SPS. The latter can be imposed on specific trading partners. Thus, 
we alternatively consider TBT specific trade concerns (STC), in which 
TBT is specifically against Korean exports. Regular meetings of the WTO 
TBT committee are held thrice a year, in which a WTO member can 
voice a concern about TBTs imposed by other members. These concerns 
are counted as the number of TBT STCs. 
Figure 4 displays TBT STCs raised by the Korean government and 
SPSs against Korean exports. The Korean government raised 59 cases 
of TBT STCs during the sample period. Moreover, the government 
Note: The value represents the number of WTO notifications.
Source: WTO I-TIP (Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal)
Figure 3
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discussed 13 cases in 2017. The number of TBT STCs from Korea has 
increased significantly since the late 2000s. Many TBT concerns raised 
by South Korea are unsolved and deferred to the next meetings. 
The Korean government raised 18 concerns to Chinese TBTs followed 
by the EU (13), the US (6), and India (5). The majority of the TBT STCs 
are for electric and electronic products (59.19%), which is the major 
export-oriented industry for Korea, toys and gaming machines (7.97%), 
other vehicles (7.44%), machinery (5.04%), and steel products (4.54%). 
WTO members seemingly adopted TBTs on Korean exports to protect 
their domestic industries beyond legitimacy, along with trade remedies 
(Jang and Nam 2010).
WTO members adopted 32 measures against Korean exports in 
the sample period for SPS. Measures increased between 2011 and 
2014 but declined thereafter. The US have the highest value with 
(6) measures followed by Australia (4), Taiwan (4), Peru (4), and the 
Philippines (3). The list of these countries is also similar with the case 
of trade remedies. The majority of SPSs were adopted on live animals 
and vegetable products (HS 01-10) and processed foods (HS 11-24) by 
fundamental feature: fruits and nuts (10), meats (8), trees and plants (8), 
live animals (6), and dairy products (4).
Appendix Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the annual number of 
countries raised by Korea’s TBT STCs or adopted SPSs for Korean 
Note: The value represents the number of WTO notifications.
Source: WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal
Figure 4
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exports. Both numbers substantially increased in the late 2000s, 
thereby showing similar trends with Figure 4. These increases in 
technical measures for Korean exports seemingly arise from new 
initiators and frequently imposing countries. We conclude that volume 
and variety matter to the increase in technical measures for Korean 
exports.3 
III. Econometric Specifications
A. Theoretical Background 
We empirically examine the impact of trade remedies, such as 
TBT and SPS, on Korean exports. The majority of the related studies 
conducted have analyzed the effects of “unilateral” NTMs imposed 
by an importing country on “bilateral” trade. For this case, the trade 
diversion effect was hardly detected because NTMs were equally applied 
to all WTO member countries under the “most favored nation” principle. 
Meanwhile, we investigate the impact of specific trade-restrictive 
measures, such as antidumping, countervailing measure, TBT STCs, 
and bilateral SPSs, imposed by importing countries on Korean exports. 
Trade remedies are generally believed to have negative impact on 
exports through an increase in tariff (Sun et al. 2014). However, the 
trade effects of TBT and SPS can vary on the basis of measurement, 
objective, affected industry, and characteristics of the imposing 
countries. If NTMs, such as TBT and SPS, are obstacles to trade, 
then they become non-tariff “barriers” (Ghodsi et al. 2017). However, 
the effects are not necessarily negative because technical measures 
originally improve health, sanitation, quality of products, and protection 
of environment.
Exporting firms should incur compliance costs to develop products 
that satisfy new standards and regulations or acquire the required 
certificates for production. These costs can increase the export price, 
thereby emphasizing the trade restrictive effects (Maskus et al. 2000). 
By contrast, standards and certificates that reinforce quarantine can 
shape consumption patterns and enhance consumer trust on product 
3 We also found that countries adopted technical measures on new sectors, 
such as electrinics and food, when the number increased for Korean exports 
from the wiiw NTMs data set. We did not report the relevant figure for brevity.
145NEW TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AND EXPORTS
quality, which is called trade promotion effects (Thilmany and Barrett 
1997). 
The net effects of technical measures on trade are ambiguous 
because they can be determined by relative forces between trade 
restrictive effects and trade promotion effects, depending on the nature 
of country and industries (Fugazza 2008). Therefore, the effects of TBT 
and SPS on exports are empirical questions (Jang et al. 2011).
B. Empirical Model
This study’s empirical model relies on the gravity model. Bilateral 
trade volume among countries increases as economic size enlarges 
and distance between two countries decreases in the standard gravity 
model (Krugman et al. 2012). We employ the augmented gravity model, 
in which the standard gravity model incorporates tariff, TBT, and SPS. 
The equation of the baseline model is as follows:
 2 310 , , , ,ijkt i t j t i jEX Y Y D
β βββ=   (1)
where the dependent variable EXijkt is the export volume of industry 
k from country i to country j in year t, the explanatory variable is the 
real GDP of country i in year t, Yj,t is the real GDP of country j in year 
t, and Di,j is the distance between country i and country j. Given that 
South Korea is the only exporting country included in this study,4 Yi,t 
is controlled by year dummies and consequently excluded from the 
equation. The reason is that the exporter GDP is fixed each year and 
subsumed in year dummies. Additional explanatory variables, such as 
free trade agreement (FTA), tariff, and other trade-restrictive measures 
are included. Moreover, we take a log transformation to derive the 
augmented gravity model as follows:
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
ln ln ln )ln ln 1(ijkt jt ij jkt ijt
ijkt ijkt ijkt k j t ijkt
EX Y D FTA
TR TBTstc SPS
β β β β τ β
β β β γ δ φ ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + +  
 (2)
where τ and FTA are the MFN ad valorem equivalent tariff and 
a dummy variable representing the existence of FTA between two 
4 Gravity framework remains applicable because this case is special case, in 
which the number of exporting country is fixed as one instead of many.
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trading parties, respectively; TRijkt is the level of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties against imposed subsidy by country j on exports 
from South Korea at product k in year t; and TBTstcijkt is a specific 
trade concern raised by Korea against TBT imposed on product k in 
year t. Analysis of the reports on the global TBTs may underestimate 
their trade effects on a specific exporting country because TBTs are 
equally applied on all trading partners (Disdier et al. 2008). The WTO 
TBT notifications also merely represent the adoption of new technical 
regulations rather than barriers to other trade partners. Hence, 
difficulty will ensue in distinguishing the trade restrictive and trade 
promotion effects with the WTO TBT’s notification. Meanwhile, TBT 
STCs can have a more substantial impact on trade than global TBT 
notifications because exporting countries raise concern on TBTs, 
particularly when the significant amount of products are exported and 
negatively affected. We use bilateral SPSs, which only obtain products 
exported from South Korea and few other countries, rather than from 
all exporting countries.
We include the product dummy γk, importing country dummy δj, and 
year dummy øt in Equation (2) to control for product characteristics, 
an importing country’s attribute and macroeconomic shocks (Chen 
and Novy 2011). Estimates can be biased if an unobserved trade 
barrier is omitted and a multilateral resistance is not considered 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Feenstra (2003) shows that bias 
can be resolved by including exporter and importer dummy variables. 
However, a multilateral resistance term is time-varying in the panel 
gravity framework. The problem of biased estimates will remain if 
an unobserved trade barrier is omitted. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) 
includes the dummies for country and time pair effects (it, jt) to 
resolve this problem. In case country and country-time pair dummies 
are included simultaneously, several variables are excluded from 
the analysis owing to multicollinearity. Therefore, we consider only 
the country dummy variables in the baseline model and include the 
importer-year pair dummy variables for the robustness check. Given 
that South Korea is the only exporting country in our model, only 
importing countries are considered country dummies.
Previous studies have used a random effect or a fixed effect model as 
an empirical strategy to estimate Equation (2). Thus, zero trade flows 
decreased. However, zero trade may contain important information on 
a firm’s decision not to export relevant to the high fixed costs of trade. 
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Thus, an exclusion of zero trade flows may cause inconsistency in the 
estimates from selection bias. In addition, estimates can be biased if a 
heteroscedasticity problem exists in the log-linearized model, such as 
Equation (2). This study uses the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood 
estimation (PPML) developed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to 
resolve these econometric problems. The transformed Equation (2) using 
PPML is as follows:
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7




ijkt jt ij ijkt ijkt ijkt k t
jt ij jkt ijt
ijkt ijkt ijkt k j t




β β β β τ β
β β β γ δ φ
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
 (3) 
Lagging variables of new trade-restrictive measures are opt for one 
to three years. Moreover, the lead variable by one year is included to 
resolve a potential endogeneity problem between these variables and 
export volume. Anti-dumping or countervailing measures are likely 
to be taken on products in increasing imports or are expected to. We 
investigate the impact of new trade-restrictive measures on exports in 
the previous year because the export volume can shrink because of an 
importing country’s investigation on unfair trade. This investigation is 
called investigation effects or threatening effects (Prusa 1992; Staiger 
and Wolak 1994; Sun et al. 2014).
 
C. Measurement and Data
a) Measurement of Trade-Restrictive Measures
An inventory method quantifies the level of new trade-restrictive 
measures. We use the frequency index and coverage ratio similar to 
Fugazza (2008) to construct a product-level variable. The frequency 
index is computed as the ratio of products, in which a measure is 










where Djl is 1 if the importing country j imposes a trade-restrictive 
measure on product l imported from South Korea more than once or 
0 if otherwise. Product l is classified at HS-6 digit within industry k at 
HS-2 digit. Mjl obtains 1 if country j imports product l from Korea and 0 
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otherwise.
The coverage ratio is measured as the percentage share of the import 
volume affected by trade-restrictive measures among the total import 










where Vjl is the volume of product l imported from South Korea to 
country j and ∑Vjl is the total volume of imports in industry k from 
South Korea to country j. ∑DjlVjl is the volume of total products to 
which a trade-restrictive measure is applied. The coverage ratio closely 
measures the level of trade-restrictive measures to reality by placing 
weight on the basis of trade volume, compared with the frequency 
index, in which trade volume is not considered. However, a potential 
endogeneity issue can exist for the coverage ratio if the volume of 
import Vjl is affected by the policy dummy variable Djl (Choi et al. 2015).
b) Data 
Trade remedies and technical measures are collected from the 
wiiw NTM Database, which covered 106 importing countries with 
96 products at HS-2 digits between 1996 and 2015. The wiiw NTM 
Database was compiled as a research project called Productivity, Non-
tariff Measures and Openness funded by the European Commission 
(Ghodsi et al. 2017). This data set substantially reduced the omitted HS 
code in the WTO I-TIP notification by matching WTO I-TIP with various 
sources of data and increasing the share of matched HS code from 43% 
to 75%. The summary table of NTMs are as follows.
The mean of each frequency index in Table 1 is extremely low 
compared with the 40-60% of the average TBT frequency index and 12-
60% of the average SPS frequency index in Choi et al. (2015) and Cho 
et al. (2017), respectively. However, this result is no longer surprising 
because previous studies have used unilateral TBTs and SPSs. Thus, 
the numbers are considerably higher than those of TBT STCs and 
bilateral SPS used in this research. 
We use the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database 
and MFN ad valorem tariff rate is extracted from the WTO Tariff 
Analysis Online. The annual real GDPs of each importing countries are 
collected from the WDI World Development Indicator database. Distance 
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among South Korea and importing countries are from the Center 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. The WTO 
regional trade agreements database provide information on whether a 
country has FTA with Korea. Table 2 summarizes the statistics of the 
explanatory variables. 
IV. Empirical Results
A. Baseline Results 
Table 3 and 4 show the empirical results for all industries. Table 3 
reports the results using the frequency index, while Table 4 shows those 
with the coverage ratio. The effects of the MFN tariff on Korean exports 
are negative in all model specifications. This result is robust across 
different time lags and types of the trade-restrictive measure. Exports 
from Korea increase as the real GDP of importing countries increases. 
Table 1
summAry sTATisTics of neW TrAde-resTricTive meAsures
Variable Index Observations Mean Std. Min Max
TR
FI 109,948 0.80 8.3 0 100
CR 109,948 1.00 9.2 0 100
TBT STC
FI 109,948 1.30 10.9 0 100
CR 109,948 1.50 11.6 0 100
SPS
FI 109,948 0.01 0.9 0 100
CR 109,948 0.01 1.0 0 100
Table 2
summAry sTATisTics of explAnATory vAriAbles
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max
EX 138,677 38711.21 497455.7 0 5.25E+07
ln(τ+1) 138,677 0.089 0.105 0 2.950735
lnY 138,677 20.927 1.970 14.661 25.83497
lnD 138,677 8.976 0.535 6.858 9.881444
FTA 138,677 0.134 0.341 0 1
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Moreover, the distance between importer and South Korea decreases. 
These results are relatively similar to previous gravity literature, while 
the FTA dummy is positive but statistically insignificant. 
The statistical significance of trade remedy (TR) varies depending 
on the time lag. The effects of TR is statistically insignificant at time 
t and afterwards (see Table 3). Meanwhile, TR has a positive impact 
on Korean exports for the previous year of dumping investigation. TR 
is also statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 4 confirms these 
results because TR is measured using the coverage ratio. 
Table 3 reports that the TBT STC measured from the frequency index 
has no significant impact on Korean exports. This result is consistent 
across different time lags and coverage ratio for TBT STC, similar 
Table 3
bAseline resulTs: All indusTries (fi)
Variable
Frequency Index
t + 1 t t – 1 t – 2 t – 3






































































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 94,035 106,091 93,241 87,526 81,792
R-squared 0.776 0.771 0.775 0.776 0.777
Log likelihood −2.16e + 09 −2.46e + 09 −2.28e + 09 −2.19e + 09 −2.08e + 09
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically 
significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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with Jang et al. (2011) and Choi et al. (2015). The net effect may be 
insignificant because of the opposite forces among the trade restrictive 
and promotion effects5 for supply and demand, respectively. 
The contemporaneous effects of SPS on Korean exports is 
insignificant. However, the effects are negative and statistically 
significant in other time lags. SPS does not affect export before it starts 
and in year t in columns 6 to 10 with the coverage ratio. However, 
SPS has adverse effects after one to three years. SPS reduces exports 
from South Korea during the time lag. This result is similar to Choi 
5 Using China’s HS-8 digit product-level data, Hu and Lin (2016) show that 
product standards can improve product quality.
Table 4
bAseline resulTs: All indusTries (cr)
Variable
Coverage Ratio
t + 1 t t – 1 t – 2 t – 3






































































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 94,035 106,091 93,241 87,526 81,792
R-squared 0.776 0.771 0.776 0.776 0.777
Log likelihood −2.16e + 09 −2.46e + 09 −2.28e + 09 −2.19e + 09 −2.08e + 09
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically 
significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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et al. (2015), which suggests that SPS is generally concentrated on 
agricultural products with low product differentiation and low trade 
promotion effects for demand. The current research paper confirms this 
idea. 
Table 5 displays the empirical results with varying times of 
multilateral resistance country-year dummy, which is similar to Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007).6 The results show that TR and TBT STC do 
not significantly affect Korean exports. The statistical significance of 
TR disappears after controlling for potential endogeneity through the 
country-year fixed effects. SPS significantly reduces exports after it 
is imposed (see Tables 5 and 6). No evidence supports the negative 
impact of trade remedies or TBT STCs in the analyses of all industries. 
Meanwhile, SPS has a significant adverse effect on trade. This result 
may be relevant to the distribution of skewed trade-restrictive measures 
6 We omitted the results with the coverage ratio because they are reatively 
similar to those with the frequency ratio.
Table 5
robusTness checK: bAier And bergsTrAnd (2007)
Variable
Frequency Index
t + 1 t t – 1 t – 2 t – 3








































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 97,399 109,948 96,624 90,657 84,670
R-squared 0.779 0.775 0.778 0.780 0.781
Log likelihood −2.1e + 09 −2.4e + 09 −2.2e + 09 −2.2e + 09 −2.1e + 09
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically 
significant at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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in a few industries. Accordingly, we examine trade-restrictive measures 
on trade by subsamples of industries.
B. Subsample of Industries 
This subsection analyzes the top six industries in which trade 
remedy or TBT STCs are substantially imposed from 1996 to 2015. The 
subsample of industries comprises HS-72 (iron and steel), 73 (iron or 
steel articles), 39 (plastic and articles thereof), 85 (electrical machinery, 
equipment, and parts thereof), 28 (organic and inorganic compounds 
of precious metals), and 55 (man-made staple fibers). SPS is excluded 
because it has not been obtained in these industries. Table 6 provides 
the empirical results the key variables of the new trade-restrictive 
measures. TR substantially reduced the exports of South Korea in all 
time lags from these six industries where anti-dumping is concentrated. 
TR has a negative impact on exports from South Korea in the previous 
year before the dumping investigation. Moreover, TR can reduce exports 
after the investigation in the other columns. A 1% point increase in the 
frequency index of TR can reduce Korean exports by 0.32% to 0.36%.7 
By contrast, TBT STC has significant positive effects on trade. Trade 
promotion is affected through an increase of consumer trust in product 
quality. This increase outweighs trade restrictive effects because of an 
increase in production costs. These six products exported by South 
Korea are featured with high technology and quality (IMF 2014). The 
increase of consumer trust caused by TBT is considerably prevalent in 
products with high technology (Hallak 2006). Jang et al. (2011) show 
that TBT increases Korean exports in industries with comparative 
advantage. 
We analyze the effects of trade-restrictive measures for the top 
six industries in which TBT STCs are generally concentrated. The 
subsample includes HS-85 (electrical machinery, equipment, and 
parts thereof), 95 (toys, games, and parts and accessories of sports 
7 By taking natural logarithm, equation (3) is transformed to log-linear model, 
as dependent variable, export is in the form of log and explanatory variable, NTM 
is in level. Assuming the coefficient of the effect of TR on exports is denoted as 
b, this effect can be calculated as 100(exp(b) − 1)%. However, for PPML analysis, 
both frequency index and coverage ratio are divided by 100, increase in 1 unit 
of TR implies increase in 100% point. Thus, the effect of TR is (exp(b) − 1)% from 
increase in 1% point of TR.
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thereof), 87 (vehicles besides railway or tramway rolling stock, parts 
and accessories thereof), 84 (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, 
mechanical appliances and parts thereof), 72 (iron and steel), and 92 
(musical instruments, parts, and accessories of such articles). The 
Table 6
TrAde remedy: Top six indusTries
Variable
Frequency Index





















Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 8,903 9,941 8,866 8,373 7,875
R-squared 0.666 0.672 0.663 0.629 0.597
Log likelihood −1.180e + 09 −1.340e + 09 −1.270e + 09 −1.270e + 09 −1.250e + 09
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 7
TbT sTc: Top six indusTries
Variable
Frequency Index























Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 8,882 9,950 8,871 8,397 7,912
R-squared 0.882 0.871 0.872 0.871 0.870
Log likelihood −4.82e + 08 −5.59e + 08 −5.16e + 08 −4.95e + 08 −4.76e + 08
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively.
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effects of SPS are excluded from the regression because there are no 
cases of SPS in these industries. Table 7 shows that TR reduced trade 
before the investigation, similar to Table 6. TBT STC increased trade 
on the previous year and after its implementation. The statistical 
significance of the impact of TBT STC disappears one to three years 
after it was imposed. The significant positive effects of TBT STC 
dissipate because the costs of conformity increase and competitors 
enter the market. Meanwhile, the effects can be positive through the 
increase of consumer trust in product quality at the early stage of 
implementation.
Table 8 reports the results using the top five industries in which SPS 
is generally imposed. These industries are HS-08 (edible fruit and nuts, 
peels of citrus fruit or melons), 06 (trees and other living plants, bulbs, 
roots, cut flowers, and ornamental foliage), 01 (live animals), 07 (edible 
vegetables, certain roots, and tubers), and 02 (edible meat and offal). 
These industries are classified as agricultural products. All columns 
show that TR does not significantly affect exports of agricultural 
products. The effects of TBT STC in these industries are negative and 
insignificant in all specifications. Meanwhile, bilateral SPS reduces 
Table 8
sps: Top five indusTries
Variable
Frequency Index


































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 1,277 1,540 1,261 1,171 1,065
R-squared 0.621 0.606 0.585 0.575 0.578
Log likelihood −2.692e + 06 −3.065e + 06 −2.733e + 06 −2.530e + 06 −2.188e + 06
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively.
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Korean exports in all time lags. The significant negative impact of SPS 
before it was imposed may be caused by the conscious self-selection of 
exporters (Lopez 2013).
C. Subsample of Countries
This section explores whether the effects of new trade-restrictive 
measures differ across destination countries. Moreover, these countries 
are dependent on its level of development. Tables 9 and 10 show the 
results for OECD member importing countries and non-OECD member 
countries, respectively. Table 9 shows how imposed TR by OECD 
member countries significantly reduced exports from Korea in all time 
lags, including threatening effects before the dumping investigation. 
The increase in the frequency index for TR by 1% point reduced Korean 
exports to OECD member countries by 0.17% to 0.36% in all columns. 
TBT STC and TR have adverse effects on trade when importing 
countries are OECD members. The estimation coefficients show that 
Korean exports decrease by 0.32% to 0.36% as the frequency index of 
TBT STC increases by 1% point. This result is consistent with Jang 
et al. (2011), which find the evidence of trade restrictive effects of 
TBTs obtained by developed countries. Regulations and standards on 
technology in advanced countries are higher than those in developing 
countries. Developed countries’ technological standards negatively affect 
exports from developing countries (Maskus et al. 2000). Regulation on 
high technology may incur high costs of conformity, thereby increasing 
trade barriers (Jang 2018).
SPS reduces trade in the previous year and after its implementation. 
However, the statistical significance disappears after two to three years 
of imposition. The reason for these negative effects of SPS is similar to 
the case of TBT STC. The increase in conformity costs caused by high 
standards on food ingredients by developed countries can increase 
trade barriers against exports from developing countries (Thilmany and 
Barrett 1997; Xiong and Beghin 2014). 
Table 10 provides the effects of the new trade-restrictive measures 
imposed by OECD non-member countries on trade. TR investigated 
by OECD non-members significantly increased Korean exports in all 
periods compared with the case of OECD member countries. TBT STC 
also has positive impact on Korean exports for all time lags at the 1% 
significance level. These results suggest that the effects of new trade-
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restrictive measures can differ depending on the importing country 
and industries. A product quality of Korean exports is relatively higher 
than those of other developing countries (IMF 2014). TBTs obtained 
by non-OECD countries may not significantly increase the conformity 
costs of Korean exporting firms. TBT can instead raise the conformity 
costs to other competing developing countries and build entry barriers 
to these countries. South Korea can take advantage of this effect (Bao 
and Chen 2013). Meanwhile, the impact of SPS is not significant.8 The 
insignificant effects of TR and TBT STC for the entire sample of all 
industries and countries may be due to the offset of the aforementioned 
opposing forces. 
8 SPS in other time lags, except contemporaneous year, are excluded from the 
analysis. It is because most of SPS imposed on Korean exports is obtained by 
OECD member importing countries.
Table 9
oecd member imporTing counTries
Variable
Frequency Index


































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 38,482 41,055 38,338 36,412 34,188
R-squared 0.803 0.795 0.800 0.803 0.808
Log likelihood −8.980e + 08 −1.000e + 09 −9.480e + 08 −9.150e + 08 −8.420e + 08
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively.
158 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
V. Conclusion
 
This study introduces “new trade-restrictive measures,” such as 
TR, TBT, and SPS. Moreover, this research reports these measures’ 
trends against Korean exports and provides empirical evidence of the 
different effects on trade, depending on type of measures, industry, and 
imposing country. New trade-restrictive measures can substantially 
reduce Korean exports of products, in which measures are concentrated 
and obtained by developed countries. Anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties can have negative impact on exports through threatening effects 
and decreasing price competitiveness. TBT and SPS do not need to be 
trade restrictive if trade promotion effect exists from upgrading product 
quality, alleviating asymmetric information, and increasing consumer 
trust. However, TBT and SPS by developed countries can increase the 
trade barrier because the level of technology and product quality of 
Korea is relatively low compared to these countries. Thus, the costs of 
conformity can increase. 
Government needs to enhance trade policies by considering the 
nature of industries, trading partners and to strengthen international 
Table 10
OECD NON-mEmbEr ImpOrtINg COuNtrIEs
Variable
Frequency Index


























Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 55,553 65,036 54,903 51,114 47,604
R-squared 0.838 0.839 0.848 0.852 0.859
Log likelihood −1.060e + 09 −1.240e + 09 −1.120e + 09 −1.080e + 09 −1.040e + 09
Notes:  1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 2) **, *** are statistically significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively.
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regulatory cooperation, such as a mutual recognition agreement to 
reduce the adverse effects of new trade-restrictive measures imposed by 
importing countries (Jang 2018). Meanwhile, government and exporters 
should focus on improving product quality and market environment 
rather than stop overseas shipments. Given the trade promotion effects 
of new trade-restrictive measures in some subsamples, TR, TBT, and 
SPS can be “barriers” or “springboards,” depending on how actively and 
flexibly the government and the firms cope with these measures. 
Appendix
Source: WTO I-TIP (Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal)
appendix Figure 1
AnnuAl numbers of iniTiATing counTries And iniTiATed secTors of TrAde 
remedies on KoreAn exporTs
Source: WTO I-TIP (Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal)
appendix Figure 2
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